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Representation(s) of the Sublime
H. P. Lovecraft’s narrator of The Unnamable is criticized by a friend for 
talking, of writing, about things which cannot be really talked or written about:
Besides, he added, my constant talk about “unnameable” and “unmentionable” things was 
a very puerile device, quite in keeping with my lowly standing as an author. I was too fond 
of ending my stories with sighs or sounds which paralyzed my hero’s faculties and left 
them without courage, words, or associations to tell what they had experienced \
One might suspect that the friend, Joel Manton, accuses Carter, the narrator 
and a writer, of writing about nothing, of giving names to things which are 
unnameable and thus nonexistent from the point of view of scientific or 
philosophical discourse for which, as Manton puts it, “it is quite impossible to 
refer to any object or spectacle which cannot be clearly depicted by the solid 
definitions of fact or the correct doctrines of theology” 2. The world, both 
human and divine, is thus thinkable only as nameable, as capable of being 
properly named and expressed. To refer to something as unnameable is to deny 
the possibility of its (at least linguistic) presentation and definition simul­
taneously claiming some kind of presence for that something. In other words, 
promising to present the unnamable, the narrator leaves his heroes without 
words to express their experiences otherwise than as unnamable. This is exactly 
what happens in “The Unnamable”. Joel Manton, paralyzed and terrified 
describes his experience to which he is gradually led by the movement of the 
narrative using a number of contradictory phrases only to eventually name it 
as unnameable:
*H. P. Lovecraft, The Lurking Fear and Other Stories (New York: Eagle Books, 1971), p. 99.
2 Ibid., p. 99.
“No — it wasn’t that way at all. It was everywhere — a gelatin — a slime — yet it had 
shapes, a thousand shapes of horror beyond all memory. There were eyes — and 
a blemish. It was the pit — the maelstrom — the ultimate abomination. Carter, it was 
the unnamablel”3
Lovecraft introduces his friend, and the reader, to the unnameable “un­
teaching” them the “deafness to the delicate overtones of life”4 by way of 
“unnaming” the experience whose only name can be “the unnamable”, the 
word which does not really name anything, still attesting to its (unnameable’s) 
existence.
The unnameable can remain unnameable only as long as it remains 
unnamed, a negativity of sorts whose verbal actualization would annihilate it. 
Curing our “deafness”, learning an ability to hear the “delicate overtones of 
life”, leads straight to a St. Mary’s Hospital in which Lovecraft’s story ends, 
and where Joel Manton tries to express his experience. The expression of the 
unnameable would possibly become a cure, a return to the world without any 
overtones, a safe world of the “homely” names. M anton’s failed attempt at 
expressing it leaves it as a lurking fear which is there, but whose expression has 
to be suppressed, repressed into the sphere beyond language as a meaning, or 
content, without a name. Though textually unpresentable, this content is 
bound to be mediated by a narrative which cannot repeat the experience. It can 
only posit it as a memory, as remembering, as an anteriority which cannot 
become an object of a history, of a science, and thus a source of anxiety, a form 
of expectation which Harold Bloom identifies with the poetic Sublime.
Bloom reads Freud as a poet of the Sublime who has “more in common 
with Proust and Montaigne than with biological scientists” because
... his interpretations of life and death are mediated always by texts, first by the literary 
texts of others, and then by his own earlier texts, until at last the Sublime meditation 
of otherness begins to be performed by his text-in-process5.
No meditation of otherness, it seems, can be otherwise than sublime. 
Since, in Bloom’s reading, the true origin of the Sublime in Freud is “the ego’s 
earliest defense, its primal repression”, then the idea of putting the repressed 
in presentation is a “parody of the Sublime” comparable to the id (the realm 
outside the ego) perceiving the id, which both Freud and Bloom find in 
Jung6. The meditation of otherness is thus bound to be “poetic” as it is 
incapable of bringing the other back home to the ego because once repressed,
3 Ibid., p. 106.
4 Ibid., p. 99.
5 H. Bloom, “Freud and the Sublime: A Catastrophe Theory of Creativity”, in Contemporary 
Critical Theory, ed. D. Latimer (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1989), p. 556.
6 Ibid., p. 550.
“images or thoughts ... cannot make their way into consciousness, yet their 
content can, on condition that it is denied”7. Like the poetics of Lovecraft’s 
unnameable, the poetics of otherness is a negative poetics in which naming is 
a mode of the denial of the content which allows this content to “make its way” 
into the presentable without actually being presented. The unnameable is thus 
only an apparent opposite of the nameable in the way Freud’s das Heimliche is 
only an apparent opposite of the uncanny, das Unheimliche, “for this uncanny”, 
here is Bloom quoting Freud from Beyond the Pleasure Principle, “is in reality 
nothing new or foreign, but something familiar and old-established in the mind 
that has been estranged only by the process of repression”8.
Something other, estranged, and yet familiar, domestic and close, is, of 
course, an oxymoron bringing to mind the oxymoron of the pleasurable terror 
or horror to be found in the eighteenth-century writings on the sublime, from 
Addison through Burke to Kant. “The feeling of the sublime”, says Kant in The 
Critique o f Judgement.
is ... at once a feeling of displeasure, arising from the inadequacy of imagination in the 
aesthetic estimation of magnitude to attain to its estimation by reason, and a simul­
taneously awakened pleasure, arising from this very judgement of the inadequacy of 
sense of being in accord with ideas of reason, so far as the effort to attain to these 
is for us a law9.
In other words, the sublime constitutes an object of our interest in Kant 
only as a kind of background against which the law of reason appears, or is 
signalled, as the awakened pleasure of human ability to judge. Though fearful, 
the sublime is simultaneously attractive because it actually grants us the 
(epistemological) security of position. As if extending Burke’s idea that the 
sublime can be delightful only when its terrible aspects do not “press too 
nearly”, when they are “at certain distances, and with certain modifications” 10, 
Kant sees such a distant, secure position away from nature. In The Critique of 
Judgement he says that the “boundless ocean rising with rebellious force” is 
attractive “for its fearfulness” only provided that “our own position is secure” 11. 
Though he calls “the might of nature” “irresistible”, he simultaneously posits 
human-being away from the terrifying might of nature, inscribes the resistance 
within man in the way he inscribes the moral law within him leaving the starry 
sky at some very distant distance. “The irresistibility of the might of nature”,
7 Ibid., p. 548.
8 Ibid., p. 543.
91. Kant, The Critique o f Judgement, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1973), p. 106.
1-E. Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin o f our Ideas o f the Sublime and Beautiful 
(London: 1812), pp. 59—60.
111. Kant, 7he Critique..., p. 111.
he says, “forces upon us the recognition of our physical helplessness as beings 
of nature, but at the same time reveals a faculty of estimating ourselves as 
independent of nature” 12.
The security of position in thus granted us somehow paradoxically, as 
Kant’s “we” seems to be referring to creatures which are s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  
natural and independent of nature. What Paul Crowther calls “the awareness 
of our moral existence” which enables us to recognize objects as fearful in 
K ant13 is not the awareness which only accompanies us while “beholding 
mighty natural objects from the position of safety” 14 but is actually con­
stitutive of that position as a gesture of resistance which, also simultaneously, 
marks the feeling of fear as actually somehow immoral. Like in Freud, no 
exploration of the fearful sphere of the sublime is thinkable in Kant, as it would 
demand the abandonment of the trench of the morally secure position. As 
unpresentable, the sublime is productive of a painful delight called enthusiasm 
which borders on dementia, and, according to Lyotard, “is a pathological 
attack and as has such in itself no ethical validity, since ethics requires one to 
be free of all motivating pathos” 15.
There is no sign of the sublime in Kant, and it is for this reason that “in 
itself’ it is ethically empty, which emptiness testifies to the fullness and 
completeness of the moral law as the fright which we feel transcending, or 
actually transgressing, the moral order of things. Though unnameable (un­
presentable), the sublime thus rendered as already categorised “otherness”, is 
a somehow negative sign enabling us to estimate our (moral) being “indepen­
dent of nature”, a “simply negative presentation” (Kant’s term) which, in 
Lovecraft, was an attempt to make us sensitive to the delicate overtones of 
nature, and which in Kant actually deafens us to those overtones as the 
“sounds” of the Schwärmerei, of the “tumult of exaltation” which is also a mark 
of insanity16. The “quasiperceptibility” (again Kant’s term) of the sublime 
‘situation’ makes Lyotard wonder whether there is a room for an aesthetic of 
the sublime in K ant In The Inhuman he writes:
The principal interest that Kant sees in the sublime sentiment is that it is the ‘aesthetic’ 
(negative) sign of a transcendence proper to ethics, the transcendence of the moral law 
and of freedom. In any case, the sublime cannot be the fact of a human art, or even of 
a nature ‘complicit’ ... with our sentiment17.
12 Ibid., p. 111.
13 P. Crowther, The Kantian Sublime. From Morality to Art (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989),
p. 110.
14 Ibid., p. 110.
13 J-F. Lyotard, “The sign of History”, in Post-structuralism and the Question o f History, eds.
D. Attrridge, G. Bennington, R. Young (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 173.
16 Ibid., 173.
17 J-F. Lyotard, The Inhuman. Reflections on 71 me, trans. G. Bennington and R. Bowlby 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pp. 136— 137.
Kant “invests” in the sublime (the word “interest” underlined by Lyotard 
suggest that what is at stake is a certain investment) which, as unpresentable, 
cannot be an object of a reasonable philosophical investigation, in order to 
gain the natural which would be complicit with our sentiments. If nature is 
a “totality of rules” 18, as he defines it in Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysics, then the sublime experience is in fact contrary to the natural and 
the human both being, as it seems, one and the same thing whose regulation is 
prompted by sentiment, by the law of the heart. Hence the experience of the 
sublime can only be made accessible through the aesthetic imagination as 
beautiful, as an object of art which has already been “theatricalized and 
framed” 19. What results from this “theatricalization” is exactly the security of 
position as an aesthetic distance which, according to Sartre, positions the 
aesthetic object “behind itself’, so that “it becomes untouchable, it is beyond 
our reach; hence arises a sort of disinterest in it”20.
If Kant began, as Anthony J. Cascardi claims, “the tradition in aesthetics 
which takes the beautiful as something essentially unreal”21, then this 
“derealization” is in fact a realization of the unreal achieved by aesthetization 
of the sublime, by its framing, which gesture posits the sublime (already made 
beautiful) outside the natural as real, but still within the scope of the natural, 
human sentiments. Artistic beauty is higher than nature, as Hegel claimed, only 
provided that it also has some other nature which is still contingent with our 
sentiments. The sublimation of nature in art which moves nature above nature 
is simultaneously a desublimation of the sublime as unpresentable, a presen­
tation of the pleasurable terror without the terror which results from the 
realization of the “unpresentabilty” of the sublime. What is at stake in the 
sublimation of nature, as Cascardi rightly claims, is “the process of raising and 
purifying nature by aestheticizing it”22 and thus positing it as puriliable by 
man. This purification, as it seems, actually means potentiality of presentation 
which inscribes the law, Kant’s totality of rules, within the order of art which 
thus becomes but an extension of the natural order of things. Art purifies 
nature of the terror of the sublime thus confirming the existence of the law and 
order within man.
A literary expression of terror is thus always already an aesthetic expres­
sion, a theatricalized, framed presentation which is simultaneously negative in
181. Kant, "Prolegomena" to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. P. Carus, rev. J. W. Ellington 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982), p. 62.
19 Cf. A.J. Cascardi, “From the Sublime to the Natural: Romantic Responses to Kant”, in 
Literature and the Question o f Philosophy, ed. A. L. Cascardi (Baltimore and London: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1987), p. 107.
20 i-P. Sartre, The Psychology o f Imagination (London: Methuen, 1972), p. 225. Quoted in 
ibid., j}. 107.
21 Ibid., p. 106.
22 Ibid., p. 105.
the sense that it renounces what it attempts to present thus somehow catharticaUy 
purifying our nature by way of making it sensitive to the value of order and, law. 
Such is, at least, Stephen King’s position as regards the horror genre. In Danse 
Macabre he says that “the creator of horror fiction is above all else and agent of 
the norm”23 and in an interview included in Bare Bones he enlarges upon the idea:
... horror fiction is really as Republican as a banker in a three-piece suit. The story is 
always the same in terms of its development. There’s an incrusion into taboo lands, 
there’s a place where you shouldn’t go, but you do, the same way that your mother 
would tell you that the freak tent is a place you shouldn’t go, but you do. And the same 
thing happens inside: you look at the guy with three eyes, or you look at the fat lady or 
you look at the skeleton man or Mr. Electrical or whoever it happens to be. And when 
you come out, well, you say, “Hey, I’m not so bad, I’m all right A lot better than 
I thought”. It has the effect of reconfirming values, of reconfirming self-image and our 
good feelings about ourselves.... and let me further suggest that it is not the physical or 
■ mental aberration which horrifies us, but rather the lack of order which these situations 
imply24.
Clinton voters, as it seems, do not read horror fiction or read it not as lacking 
order, but as a politically programmatic, positive rather than negative, kind of 
writing. Though Kant uses somehow different kind of idiom in his inter­
pretation of the sublime, he also posits it as a taboo land of sorts which, as 
unpresentable, cannot in fact be presented in writing whose order demands the 
ordering of the presented. If Kant’s sublime is rendered as an unreality of sorts, 
as an unnatural nature thus negatively being named as both “the unpresentab­
le” and “the sublime”, horror fiction offers us an orderly, because written, 
vision of disorder simultaneously rendering it as fictitious and thus derealizing 
it from the start. Horror fiction is thus both appealing and appalling, and what 
appeals to us is exactly the fiction of the appalling. It is the label “fiction”, be it 
a written or an unwritten one, which grants the reader of horrors the security 
of position which does not put him or her in the position at which 
self-preservation is endangered. An intrusion to Stephen King’s taboo lands is in 
fact a guided tour through the world of stuffed monsters displayed there only in 
order to confirm the value of the homely reality of the normal. Like Lovecraft’s 
Manton from before his initiation into the unnamable, King’s reader is always 
already convinced that the abnormal he is offered by a horror story does not 
actually exist thus, as it were, defeating the abnormal, denying the possibility of 
its intrusion into the normal which the horror story “presents”.
Such a defeat of the abnormal is inscribed, according to Noel Carroll, 
within the “deep structure” of the horror fiction. From the point of view like 
King’s, he writes:
23 S. King, Danse Macabre Berkeley Books (New York: 1987), p. 48.
24 Bare Bones: Conversations on Terror with Stephen King, eds. T. Underwood and C. Miller 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1988), pp. 9 and 39.
... the deep structure of the horror fiction is a three-part movement: 1) from normality 
(a state of affairs in which our ontologico-value schema rests intact); 2) to its disruption 
(a monster appears, shaking the very foundations of the culture’s cognitive map 
— which aflront itself may be perceived as immoral/abnormal — and predictably, the 
monster also does forbidden things like eating people); 3) to the final confrontation and 
defeat of the abnormal, disruptive being (thereby restoring the culture’s scheme of things 
by eliminating the anomaly and punishing its violations of the moral order)25.
Since a deep structure is at stake, there also must be some “horror fiction 
competence” (running parallel to Culler’s “literary competence” and Chom­
sky’s “linguistic competence”) within our minds which makes us not only 
competent to eliminate the anomalous (sentences, for instance), but which 
actually necessitates this elimination. Carroll sees this competence at work also 
in the “rituals of rebellion” (from saturnalia to the present day Carnival) in 
which “customary decorum, morality, and taboos may be relaxed”, but which, 
though including “some criticism of the social order ... contain that protest in 
a way that preserves and strengthens it” 26. Yet, as Carroll rightly notices, such 
an aprioristic allegorizing of horror fictions as purely ideological writings 
preserving the status quo does not work in cases (as is the case with Lovecraft’s 
The Unnamable, for instance) where the “abnormal” is not quite eliminated or 
banished27. The politically or morally cathartic effect of such stories is at least 
doubtful. Moreover, rather than eliminating the horrifying, The Unnamable as 
it were attempts at normalizing it, at bringing it within the sphere of the 
familiar and thus, paradoxically, inscribing the unfamiliar within the familiar as 
a residue, an “overtone” of the other which contaminates the security of 
position by the very possibility of its “being there” and simultaneously “here”, 
within the world of Stephen King’s bankers in three-piece suits.
It is exactly the paradox of “unnaming” reality, of denying its absolute 
“nameability” which, though a negative gesture, does not render the unname- 
able as an anomaly or monstrosity which endanger human position, but posits 
the question which Lyotard, hardly a horror story teller, asks in the 
introduction to his The Inhuman: “... what if what is ‘proper’ to humankind 
were to be inhabited by the inhuman?” 28 The possibility of posing such 
a question necessitates a certain demolition of the secure distance which 
aestheticizes the sublime in Burke, Kant and elsewhere. This, according to 
Lyotard, can be done from the postmodern perspective which is the perspective 
of putting forward the unpresentable, the sublime, in presentation itself29.
25 N. Carroll, The Philosophy o f Horror or Paradoxes o f the Heart (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1990), p. 200.
26 Ibid., pp. 200—201.
27 Cf. ibid., pp. 201—201
28J-F . Lyotard, The Inhuman..., p. 2.
29 J-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. G. Bennington and 
B. Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. 81.
What, however, is also at stake in the postmodern, the poststructuralist or 
the deconstructive seems to be the definite “the” delimiting the scope of the 
unnameable to a certain presentabilty which takes place, which can take place, 
only if the presentable, the aestheticized or the theorised is still available as 
a background, as marginalised foundation against which the postwhatever 
discourse defines itself as marginal. Without saying “no” to “the” o“the”r, 
neither does it quite say “no” to its opposite thus granting itself at least 
a marginal security of position exactly by saving the opposition. The Derridean 
“yes and no” answer to mostly everything is not, of course, the Kingean or 
Burkean escape to the normal, but it is simultaneously a gesture which 
sublimates the norm by contaminating it with the possibility of being an 
infinite play of discourse constantly overreaching itself. Yet this overreaching 
(dissemination, trace, transgression, abundance) actually posits the sublime as 
a positive category, as the norm of discourse, as a certain property which lacks 
properties. In a certain sense, the postmodern is thus a construction of the 
sublime, of the without properties, of the infinite, the inhuman, the unnameable 
which simultaneously renders this construction as desirable without quite 
identifying itself with it by way of questioning identity itself. It is in the paradox 
of putting the unpresentable forward in presentation that inscribes a finitude 
into the infinite within the postmodern discourse thus actually repressing, let us 
return to Freud for a while, the repressed within the posited possibility of its 
expression, by marking the repressed, somehow against the grain of Freud’s 
speculations, as “wanted” within the sphere of the presentable. Hence a certain, 
however hidden, policing within the postmodern. The sublime, the unnameable 
is wanted, desired to be let free in a freeplay of the signifiers, but it is also 
clearly marked as transgressive or anomalous, as something to be coped with 
in writing, in making present without which Lyotard’s “inhumanization” of 
reality would be its “dehumanization”.
It is here, I think, in the necessity of a presentation which denies 
presentation, that the postmodern is incapable of saying a “yes”, even to itself. 
In its criticism of properties, of the proper, the postmodern at the same time 
wants to avoid the position of being possessed, of being given but also of giving 
itself, as well as of being mad. It is here, I think, that the feminist criticism finds, 
generally, postmodernism almost as phallogocentric as Cleland’s Fanny Hill, 
for instance. “Being possessed”, says Hélène Cixous, “is not desirable for 
a masculine imagery, which would interpret is as passivity — a dangerous 
feminine position” 30. The fear of being possessed is the gesture of repression of 
the femininity within the masculine which, according to Cixous, also forms the 
basis of psychoanalysis. In its denial of giving itself, of being possessed,
30 H. Cixous, “Sorties: Out and Out: Attacks (Ways Out) Forays”, in The Feminine Reader. Essays 
in Gender and the Politics o f Literary Criticism, eds. C. Belsey and J. Moore (Macmillan, 1989), p. 105.
poststructural discourse sublimates itself to the sphere beyond human reach so 
as to conceal its own femininity, the “being possessed” whose passive silence is 
threatening because it does not demand anything in return for the giving. In its 
denial of being possessed the masculine postmodernism gains identity exactly 
because of its refusal to give itself. The woman, the feminie, gives herself in the 
disintersted gesture coming from her “capacity to depropriate herself without 
self-interest”31. Hence the sublime is raised, or erected, by men as the 
threatening outside and simultaneously an abstract object of exploration in 
order to externalize their own femininity and to simultaneously objectify it as 
the unnamable, for instance, or as a mysterious overtone of nature which in 
women is natural voice singing from within as the voice of love:
The Voice sings from a time before law, before the symbolic took one’s breath away and 
reappropriated it into language under its authority of separation. The deepest, the oldest 
the loveliest Visitation. Within each woman the first, nameless love is singing32.
“Women have not sublimated. Fortunately” 33. For Cixous the sublime is 
a category of political/economic repression of giving, of being possessed. The 
nameless love which is the singing cf the body is to be listened to rather than 
classified as the unnamable or the sublime.
Though far from being written ab o u t ,  the sublime is made audible 
throughout Cixous’ text. Rather than representing, the femininine writing is to 
make human body heard, and what we hear is not the representation or 
theorization of the unnameable, of the repressed, of the sublime, but an 
outburst of the unconscious, of the suppressed “varied entirety, moving and 
boundless change, a cosmos where eros never stops travelling”34. Rather than, 
like Burke or Kant, stepping away from the sublime, or like Lovecraft, Lyotard 
or Derrida positing it as the unnameable, the unpresentable or the difference 
irreducibly attached to reality as the other, in Cixous we should let the feminine 
speak, “tear her out of the superegoed, over-Mosesed structure” 35 and listen to 
her voice without fear or horror as to our voice of love coming from within.
That such a voice of love may not sound very attractive to a Republican 
reader of horrors seems to be hardly questionable. Heard from within oneself, 
given by oneself as always already possessed and thus never one’s own, such 
a voice can only be an affirmative one as regards what has been, very 
provisionally, termed here as the sublime; an “I will Yes” with which Cixous 
embarks towards a new writing which “can only go on and on, without ever 
inscribing or distinguishing the contours” 36.
31 Cf. ibid., p. 104.
32 Ibid., p. 111.
-?3 Ibid., p. 114.
34 Ibid., p. 108.
35 Ibid., p. 116.
36 Ibid,, p. 108.
